CFIS 24: Paris Insights – The Current Global Regulatory & Investment Environment: The OECD Countries’ Perspective on Economic Security

A.   Introduction

The global regulatory and investment environment is undergoing significant transformation, with economic security emerging as a paramount concern for OECD[i] countries. Recent geopolitical tensions, including the ongoing war in Ukraine and conflicts in the Middle East, have added layers of complexity to the international landscape.[ii] These unstable situations have exacerbated existing challenges and introduced new risks, compelling OECD countries to reassess and fortify their economic security frameworks.

Moreover, OECD countries are now facing an array of novel challenges, such as escalating threats to cybersecurity, which have become increasingly sophisticated and frequent.[iii] These cyber threats target critical infrastructure, financial systems, and government institutions, underscoring the urgent need for robust cybersecurity measures.[iv] The convergence of these geopolitical and technological threats necessitates a comprehensive and adaptive approach to economic security, emphasizing resilience, cooperation, and strategic foresight.

As OECD countries navigate these turbulent times, several critical questions arise: What are likely to be the most challenging economic security issues that OECD nations will need to address in the coming years, and how should they deal with them? What role does the OECD as an organization play during times of crisis and economic security challenges, and how can it foster a common approach while addressing differences among its member countries? How much convergence and divergence exists between OECD countries on issues of economic security? How will the 2024 European, US, UK, and Indian elections affect foreign investment regulation in OECD countries?

This background paper aims to highlight key economic security challenges, summarize the degree of convergence and divergence in policy approaches, discuss the OECD’s role in times of crisis and economic security challenges and further debates the potential impact of major elections in 2024 on foreign investment regulations.

B.    Key Economic Security Issues for OECD Countries

I.      Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

The COVID-19 pandemic, along with geopolitical tensions and natural disasters, has exposed significant vulnerabilities in global supply chains, particularly in critical sectors such as technology, pharmaceuticals, and food.[v] Ensuring the resilience and security of supply chains will be a primary challenge for OECD nations in the coming years.[vi] To address these vulnerabilities, OECD countries will need to diversify their supply sources, enhance domestic production capabilities, and invest in advanced technologies for better supply chain management.[vii] For example, the United States enacted the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022,[viii]aimed at boosting domestic semiconductor manufacturing to reduce dependency on foreign supplies. Similarly, the European Union introduced the “RescEU” mechanism, which includes strategic stockpiling of critical medical supplies and equipment,[ix] while Japan has launched initiatives to incentivize companies to relocate their production bases back to Japan or diversify to other regions in Asia, supported by substantial subsidies.[x]

In addition to legislative measures, countries are also investing in new technologies to monitor and manage supply chains more effectively. The use of blockchain technology, for instance, is being explored to increase transparency and traceability in supply chains.[xi] Companies are adopting advanced analytics and AI-driven solutions to predict and mitigate potential disruptions.[xii] Moreover, public-private partnerships are being encouraged to strengthen supply chain infrastructure and improve logistics networks[xiii].

II.    Energy Security

Energy security remains a critical concern for OECD countries as they transition to renewable energy sources while still relying heavily on fossil fuels[xiv]. Geopolitical tensions, particularly involving major energy producers, have highlighted the vulnerability of energy supplies[xv]. Balancing the transition to renewable energy with energy security, managing geopolitical risks associated with energy imports, and investing in new energy infrastructure are major challenges ahead.

For example, Germany's Energiewende (Energy Transition) policy focuses on phasing out coal and energy gas produced electricity but also nuclear power as well as increasing the share of renewables in its energy mix. With a different focus but the same aim, France is investing heavily in nuclear energy as a stable and low-carbon energy source, aiming to build new reactors and extend the life of existing ones[xvi]. The United Kingdom has set ambitious targets for offshore wind energy, aiming to produce 40GW of such energy by 2030[xvii].

Furthermore, countries are exploring innovative energy solutions such as hydrogen and bioenergy[xviii]. Japan is investing significantly in hydrogen technology, positioning itself as a leader in this sector[xix]. Similarly, the United States is investing in energy storage technologies to enhance the reliability of renewable energy sources[xx]. While Poland remains heavily reliant on coal due to its abundant domestic reserves[xxi]. But this is not the case in all countries, as for example, in the United States, former President and current candidate Donald Trump is openly advocating for an increase in the use of fossil fuels, reflecting a broader divergence in energy policies among OECD countries. These differences highlight the challenges in achieving a unified approach to energy security within the organization.

III.  Cybersecurity Threats

Cyber-attacks have become more frequent and sophisticated, targeting critical infrastructure, financial systems, and government institutions in OECD countries[xxii]. Protecting critical infrastructure from these threats, ensuring data security and privacy, and addressing the skills gap in cybersecurity are pressing challenges[xxiii]. The United States' Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has implemented the National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) to monitor and defend federal networks[xxiv]. The European Union’s NIS2 Directive aims to strengthen the cybersecurity framework by expanding the scope of critical sectors and imposing stricter security requirements[xxv]. Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy 2020 emphasizes enhancing national cyber resilience and developing a robust cybersecurity workforce[xxvi].

Moreover, countries are increasingly focusing on international cooperation to combat cyber threats[xxvii]. Initiatives like the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE) promote international collaboration and capacity building in cybersecurity[xxviii]. Public-private partnerships are also being strengthened, as private sector entities often hold significant portions of critical infrastructure[xxix]. Investments in research and development are crucial to stay ahead of evolving cyber threats, with countries like Israel leading in cybersecurity innovation and technology[xxx].

IV.  Trade Policies and Protectionism

Trade tensions, particularly between major economies, have led to increased protectionism and disruptions in global trade. Tariffs, trade barriers, and retaliatory measures have impacted economic stability[xxxi]. As underlined in the UNCTAD’s World Investment Report for 2024, “crises, protectionist policies and regional realignments are disrupting the world economy, fragmenting trade networks, regulatory environments and global supply chains. This undermines the stability and predictability of global investment flows, creating both obstacles and isolated opportunities”[xxxii].

The OECD’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Restrictiveness Index highlights the varying degrees of openness and restrictiveness of OECD countries’ investment policies, with some countries implementing more stringent FDI screening mechanisms to protect national security and critical industries from foreign influence[xxxiii]. An increase in regulatory scrutiny and national security reviews of FDI reflects growing concerns over economic sovereignty and strategic assets[xxxiv].

Navigating the complexities of global trade relations and maintaining open markets while protecting domestic industries are key challenges. For instance, the Phase One Trade Agreement between the U.S. and China in 2020 aimed to reduce trade tensions by increasing Chinese purchases of American goods and services, though issues remain unresolved[xxxv]. The US policy towards China has changed considerably since this agreement was signed (towards isolation rather than cooperation).  Similarly, the EU policy towards China has also changed - trade agreement negotiations have been unsuccessful with the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) not coming into force.

Additionally, recently countries are engaging in regional trade agreements to mitigate the impact of global trade tensions and because of the WTO’s shortcomings to enhance international trade. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is one such example where member countries are working to reduce trade barriers and promote economic integration[xxxvi]. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) also represents a significant effort to boost intra-regional trade and economic cooperation among African nations, which can have indirect benefits for OECD countries by stabilizing the global trade environment[xxxvii].

C.    The Role of the OECD in Times of Crisis and Economic Security Challenges

The OECD plays a pivotal role in addressing global economic security challenges and providing a platform for cooperation among its member countries. During times of crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical conflicts, and economic downturns, the OECD has been instrumental in fostering collaboration, sharing best practices, and developing comprehensive policy responses.

One of the key contributions of the OECD is its ability to provide timely and relevant economic analysis. The OECD Economic Outlook and various country-specific reports offer valuable insights into the economic impacts of crises and policy measures needed to mitigate these impacts[xxxviii]. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the OECD published numerous reports and policy briefs to help countries navigate the economic fallout and implement effective recovery strategies[xxxix].

The OECD also facilitates international cooperation on critical issues such as trade, investment, and tax policy. Through initiatives like the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises[xl] and the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project[xli], the organization promotes responsible business conduct and fair tax practices, helping to enhance economic security globally. The OECD’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Regulatory Restrictiveness Index provides valuable data on the openness and restrictiveness of investment policies across member countries, aiding policymakers in balancing economic openness with national security concerns[xlii].

In the area of cybersecurity, the OECD plays a crucial role in promoting best practices and facilitating information sharing among member countries. As an example, the OECD’s Recommendation on Digital Security Risk Management for Economic and Social Prosperity outlines principles for managing digital security risks, emphasizing the importance of international cooperation and public-private partnerships[xliii].

The OECD’s work on energy security is also notable. Through its collaboration with the International Energy Agency (IEA), the OECD supports member countries in developing sustainable energy policies, enhancing energy efficiency, and diversifying energy sources. This collaboration is particularly important as countries strive to balance the transition to renewable energy with maintaining energy security amidst geopolitical tensions.

The OECD has a strong cooperative relationship with the European Union. This partnership involves aligning policies and strategies to address common economic security challenges, such as ensuring the resilience of supply chains, protecting critical infrastructure, and promoting sustainable economic growth. The EU often incorporates OECD guidelines and best practices into its policy frameworks, and the two entities collaborate on various initiatives to enhance economic stability and security across Europe. For example, the EU's economic security strategy benefits from OECD insights and data, helping to shape policies that safeguard economic interests while promoting openness and innovation[xliv].

D.    Convergence

The previous sections of this background paper outlined OECD’s role in shaping international economic policy. This raises the question: is there consensus among the organization's members on economic security issues?

Many OECD countries share common goals when it comes to enhancing economic security, such as protecting critical infrastructure and ensuring energy security[xlv].

Collaborative efforts, like joint cybersecurity initiatives and shared intelligence on economic threats, highlight significant areas of convergence. For example, several OECD nations participate in the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, which fosters collaboration and knowledge-sharing on cybersecurity threats and responses[xlvi]. Additionally, common regulatory frameworks, particularly in financial markets and trade, facilitate cooperation and coordination among OECD countries. An example of common regulatory frameworks facilitating cooperation and coordination among OECD countries can be seen in the implementation of, already mentioned above, the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project[xlvii]. This initiative aims to tackle tax avoidance strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations.

In addition, OECD countries often work together on multilateral agreements to address global economic security challenges. For instance, the Anti-Bribery Convention, which commits the OECD member countries to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions[xlviii]. This agreement enhances global economic security by promoting transparency and fairness in international trade and investment, helping to level the playing field for all businesses operating across borders.

The alignment of policies through organizations like the European Union also demonstrates a strong level of convergence in economic security strategies, as member states adhere to shared standards and practices.

Moreover, as already mentioned above, currently, the prevailing trend among many countries, including OECD members, is a move towards trade restrictions and sometimes even protectionist measures. This shift is often driven by economic pressures and geopolitical uncertainties, resulting in increased tariffs and other trade barriers​[xlix].

E.    Divergence

Despite the shared goals, significant divergences in policy approaches exist due to differing national interests, economic structures, and political priorities among OECD countries. Taking FDI screening mechanisms as an example, there are significant divergences between national mechanisms. Energy policies also vary widely, with some countries heavily investing in renewable energy while others continue to rely on fossil fuels due to economic and geopolitical considerations. In the realm of cybersecurity, divergence can be seen in the varying levels of investment and regulatory approaches. Considering as an example different approaches to data protection, the EU has implemented stringent data protection laws through the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), setting high standards for data privacy and security[l]. In contrast, the United States adopts a more fragmented approach to data protection, with regulations varying significantly across different states. For example, California’s Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) provides robust privacy rights to residents, including the right to access, delete, and opt out of the sale of personal data[li]. However, other states have different or less comprehensive data protection laws. For instance, Texas has enacted the Texas Privacy Protection Act, which is less stringent compared to California’s CCPA[lii]. This discrepancy in data protection approaches highlights a significant divergence in regulatory frameworks, with the EU’s GDPR providing a unified and comprehensive standard for data protection, while the US has a patchwork of state-specific laws that create varying levels of privacy protections across the country.

These examples underscore the complex landscape of economic security policies within the OECD, where national priorities and strategic interests drive diverse approaches. While there is significant convergence on broad goals and collaborative efforts, the specific policies and strategies adopted by individual countries reflect their unique contexts and challenges.

F.    Is the OECD a “Rich Countries’ Club”?

A recurring question about the OECD is whether it functions primarily as a “rich countries club”, given that its membership is predominantly composed of high-income nations[liii]. While the organization is indeed composed mainly of economically advanced countries, its role extends beyond mere coordination among affluent nations.

Critics argue that the OECD’s focus on its wealthier members might limit its ability to address issues faced by lower-income countries[liv]. However, the OECD also works to engage with emerging economies and developing countries through various initiatives and partnerships. For instance, the OECD collaborates with non-member countries on issues such as economic development, environmental sustainability, and governance reforms. One notable example is the OECD’s work with China on green growth and environmental policies. This collaboration involves sharing best practices and policy recommendations to help China address its significant environmental challenges while promoting sustainable economic growth[lv]. Similarly, the OECD has partnered with Indonesia on tax reform and public governance to improve fiscal transparency and efficiency, fostering better governance practices[lvi]. The OECD also works with Brazil on education policy, helping to enhance educational standards and outcomes through the sharing of data and expertise[lvii]. This engagement helps to extend the OECD’s influence and support in addressing global economic security challenges that transcend national boundaries.

Overall, while the OECD’s membership is predominantly composed of wealthy nations, its activities and collaborations reflect a commitment to addressing global economic issues and fostering international cooperation beyond the confines of its membership. In the face of rising protectionism and trade tensions, the OECD advocates for open and fair-trade practices.

G.   Impact of 2024 Elections on Foreign Investment Regulation in OECD Countries

The 2024 elections particularly in the EU, the United States, the United Kingdom, and India are poised to have substantial impacts on foreign investment regulation within OECD countries.

The recent elections for the European Parliament did not result in any major changes in leadership, as the key figures and parties have largely remained in power. However, despite this apparent stability, the impact of upcoming elections in other major economies, particularly in the United States, cannot be underestimated. The current European leaders may face pressures to shift their policies, especially in light of global events such as the war in Ukraine, depending on the outcomes of these elections and the broader international political climate. The EU’s regulatory frameworks and foreign investment policies may still experience shifts as leaders respond to new global political dynamics. Potential policy changes in the EU’s approach to trade, data privacy, and environmental regulations will be crucial for investors to monitor. In this respect, it is interesting to note the personal battles over who gets what position in the EU institutions. For example, the Financial Times recently reported on potential successors to the post of trade commissioner[lviii].

In the United States, the outcome of the presidential election will be particularly influential. A change in administration could lead to shifts in trade policies, investment screening processes, and broader regulatory priorities[lix]. As underlined by Politico, “a return by Donald Trump to the White House in November could quickly destroy it [transatlantic trust] — and in turn, make it harder for the Western allies to deal with an increasingly assertive China”[lx].

The latest UK elections resulted in a major change in government, with the Labour Party taking power. This shift is poised to significantly reshape the country's post-Brexit regulatory landscape, affecting trade policies, investment regulations, and relationships with both EU and non-EU countries. The Labour Party has articulated a commitment to building a fairer, greener economy, which includes investing in public services, reducing regional inequalities, and advancing the transition to renewable energy[lxi]. While Labour may not propose a complete overhaul of existing foreign direct investment (FDI) rules, they are likely to implement stricter scrutiny on investments to ensure that they contribute to these broader economic and social objectives. This could include a greater emphasis on ensuring that FDI supports job creation, advances environmental sustainability, and promotes equitable growth across the UK[lxii]. Investors should therefore anticipate potential adjustments in trade agreements, a stronger regulatory alignment with the EU on environmental and labor standards, and a more strategic approach to FDI screening under the new government.

 Although India is not an OECD member, its recent elections have significant implications for its economic relations with OECD countries. The elections, which have already taken place, resulted in the continuation of the existing government. This continuity suggests that India's current trade policies, investment climate, and regulatory framework are unlikely to undergo major changes. As a result, the established bilateral and multilateral economic ties between India and OECD countries are expected to remain stable[lxiii]. Cooperation on technology, infrastructure, and energy will continue to be particularly important areas of interest for OECD countries as they navigate their economic relationships with India, with no immediate shifts in economic security anticipated due to the election outcomes.

In summary, the outcomes of the 2024 elections, particularly the upcoming US Presidential election, will shape the regulatory environment for foreign investment. While the elections in Europe, the UK, and India have already taken place and resulted in continuity of leadership, the U.S. election still holds potential for significant shifts. These developments could lead to both convergence and divergence in policies across OECD countries, depending on the approach taken by the newly elected or re-elected leaders..

H.   Conclusion

The global regulatory and investment environment is at a pivotal juncture, with economic security taking center stage for OECD countries. Addressing key challenges such as supply chain vulnerabilities, energy security, cybersecurity threats, and trade policies will require coordinated efforts and strategic investments. While there is convergence on many economic security issues, significant divergences remain due to differing national interests and political priorities. The past and upcoming elections in the EU, the US, the UK, and India will further shape the regulatory landscape, influencing foreign investment regulations and economic policies in OECD countries. Staying informed and adaptable will be essential for navigating these changes and ensuring economic security in an increasingly complex global environment.

[i] The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC).

[ii] World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2024, 19^th Edition, published in January 2024, available at: https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_Global_Risks_Report_2024.pdf, access on: 6 August 2024. See also, OECD, Business at OECD (BIAC) Priorities for the OECD Investment Agenda, MORE, BETTER, AND SAFE INVESTMENT November 2023, available at: https://www.businessatoecd.org/hubfs/More%2C%20Better%20and%20Safer%20Investment.pdf, access on: 6 August 2024.

[iii] Brooks C., Cybersecurity Trends & Statistics; More Sophisticated And Persistent Threats So Far In 2023, Forbes, published on 5 May 2023, available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckbrooks/2023/05/05/cybersecurity-trends--statistics-more-sophisticated-and-persistent-threats-so-far-in-2023/, access on 6 August 2024.

[iv] Maurer T., Nelson A., International Monetary Fund (IMF), THE GLOBAL CYBER THREAT, published in March 2021, available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2021/03/global-cyber-threat-to-financial-systems-maurer.htm, access on: 6 August 2024.

[v] Panwar, R., Pinkse, J., & De Marchi, V. (2022). The Future of Global Supply Chains in a Post-COVID-19 World. California Management Review, 64(2), 5-23. https://doi.org/10.1177/00081256211073355.

[vi] Shih W. C., Global Supply Chains in a Post-Pandemic World, Harvard Business Review, published in September – October 2020, available at: https://hbr.org/2020/09/global-supply-chains-in-a-post-pandemic-world, access on 6 August 2024.

[vii] OECD, Business at OECD (BIAC) Priorities for the OECD Investment Agenda, MORE, BETTER, AND SAFE INVESTMENT November 2023, available at: https://www.businessatoecd.org/hubfs/More%2C%20Better%20and%20Safer%20Investment.pdf, access on: 6 August 2024.

[viii] The White House, FACT SHEET: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China, published on: 9 August 2022, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/, access on: 6 August 2024.

[ix] European Commission. rescEU, available at: https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/resceu_en, access on: 6 August 2024. See also, Glencross, A. (2022). The EU to the rescEU? Assessing the geopolitics of the EU’s medical stockpile. European View, 21(1), 48-55. https://doi.org/10.1177/17816858221088368. See also, Beaussier A-L, Cabane L. Strengthening the EU’s Response Capacity to Health Emergencies: Insights from EU Crisis Management Mechanisms. European Journal of Risk Regulation. 2020;11(4):808-820. doi:10.1017/err.2020.80.

[x] Asia Society Policy Institute, Japan, available at: https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/supply-chains-shifting-indo-pacific/japan, access on 6 August 2024. See also, Akiyama H., Japan companies line up for 'China exit' subsidies to come home, Nikkei Asia, published on 9 September 2020, available at: https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Japan-companies-line-up-for-China-exit-subsidies-to-come-home, access on 6 August 2024.

[xi] Gaur V., Gaiha A., Building a Transparent Supply Chain Blockchain can enhance trust, efficiency, and speed, Harvard Business Review, published in May – June 2020, available at https://hbr.org/2020/05/building-a-transparent-supply-chain, access on 6 August 2024. See also, Chiaraluce, G., Bentivoglio, D., Finco, A. et al. Exploring the role of blockchain technology in modern high-value food supply chains: global trends and future research directions. Agric Econ 12, 6 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40100-024-00301-1and also, Sunny J., Undralla N., Pillai M.V., Supply chain transparency through blockchain-based traceability: An overview with demonstration, Computers & Industrial Engineering, Volume 150, 2020, 106895, ISSN 0360-8352, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2020.106895. Also, Lam B., Calderon R. F., and Entrup C., Intelligent enterprise fueling the supply chain of the future, Deloitte Insights, published on: 28 November 2022, available at: https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/focus/supply-chain/digital-brain-supply-chain-management-with-machine-learning.html, access on 6 August 2024. See also, Sengupta P., How blockchain technology can unlock climate solutions, Morningstar Sustainalytics, published on: 27 July 2022, available at: https://www.sustainalytics.com/esg-research/resource/investors-esg-blog/how-blockchain-technology-can-unlock-climate-solutions, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xii] Mittal A., Cocoual C., Erriquez M., and Liakopoulou T., McKinsey & Company, Revolutionizing procurement: Leveraging data and AI for strategic advantage, published on: 13 June 2024, available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/operations/our-insights/revolutionizing-procurement-leveraging-data-and-ai-for-strategic-advantage, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xiii] OECD, Business at OECD (BIAC) Priorities for the OECD Investment Agenda, MORE, BETTER, AND SAFE INVESTMENT November 2023, available at: https://www.businessatoecd.org/hubfs/More%2C%20Better%20and%20Safer%20Investment.pdf, access on: 6 August 2024. See also, Liu, L. X., Clegg, S., & Pollack, J. (2024). The Effect of Public–Private Partnerships on Innovation in Infrastructure Delivery. Project Management Journal, 55(1), 31-49. https://doi.org/10.1177/87569728231189989.

[xiv] IRENA, Geopolitics of the Energy Transition Critical Materials, available at: https://www.irena.org/Digital-Report/Geopolitics-of-the-Energy-Transition-Critical-Materials#page-0, access on 6 August 2024. See also, IEA, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, IEA, Paris 2021, available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions, access on: 6 August 2024. See also, Farghali, M., Osman, A.I., Chen, Z. et al. Social, environmental, and economic consequences of integrating renewable energies in the electricity sector: a review. Environ Chem Lett 21, 1381–1418 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10311-023-01587-1.

[xv] Zhang, Q., Hu, Y., Jiao, J. et al. The impact of Russia–Ukraine war on crude oil prices: an EMC framework. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 11, 8 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-02526-9. Also, Elliott L., Middle East conflict risks sharp rise in oil prices, says IMF, The Guardian, published on: 16 April 2024, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/apr/16/middle-east-conflict-risks-a-sharp-rise-in-oil-prices-says-imf, access on: 6 August 2024. See also, Vakulchuk R., Overland I., Scholten D., Renewable energy and geopolitics: A review, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Volume 122, 2020, 109547, ISSN 1364-0321, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2019.109547.

[xvi] Cingari P., Economics of nuclear power: The France-Germany divide explained, Euronews, published on 16 May 2024, available at: https://www.euronews.com/business/2024/05/16/economics-of-nuclear-power-the-france-germany-divide-explained, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xvii] Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, The Rt Hon Boris Johnson and The Rt Hon Sir Alok Sharma KCMG, Press release, New plans to make UK world leader in green energy, The announcement is part of the government's commitment towards net zero emissions by 2050 and will support 60,000 jobs, published on 6 October 2020, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-plans-to-make-uk-world-leader-in-green-energy, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xviii] IRENA, Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation. The Hydrogen Factor, available at: https://www.irena.org/Digital-Report/Geopolitics-of-the-Energy-Transformation, access on: 6 August 2024. See also, Kamran M., Turzyński M., Exploring hydrogen energy systems: A comprehensive review of technologies, applications, prevailing trends, and associated challenges, Journal of Energy Storage, Volume 96, 2024, 112601, ISSN 2352-152X, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.est.2024.112601. Also, Hassan Q., Zuhair Sameen A., Hayder M. Salman, Jaszczur M., Khudhair Al-Jiboory A., Hydrogen energy future: Advancements in storage technologies and implications for sustainability, Journal of Energy Storage, Volume 72, Part B, 2023, 108404, ISSN 2352-152X, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.est.2023.108404.

[xix] Tochibayashi N., Kutty N., World Economic Forum, Hydrogen is developing fast in Japan, edging nearer to wider use in society, published on: 10 April 2024, available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/04/hydrogen-japan/, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xx] Jarbratt G., Jautelat S., Linder M., Sparre E., van de Rijt A., Han Wong Q., Enabling renewable energy with battery energy storage systems, McKinsey & Company, published on 2 August 2023, available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/enabling-renewable-energy-with-battery-energy-storage-systems, access on: 6 August 2024. See also, The White House, Building a Thriving Clean Energy Economy in 2023 and Beyond, published on: 19 December 2023, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/blog/2023/12/19/building-a-thriving-clean-energy-economy-in-2023-and-beyond/, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xxi] Hancock A., EU energy ministers lash out at Polish effort to extend coal subsidies, Financial Times, published on: 19 June 2023, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/ae78c716-81cc-4350-865c-0c32cf9e3494, access on: 6 August 2024. See also, Kardaś S., From coal to consensus: Poland’s energy transition and its European future, European Council on Foreign Relations, published on: 27 September 2023, available at: https://ecfr.eu/publication/from-coal-to-consensus-polands-energy-transition-and-its-european-future/, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xxii] Maurer T., Nelson A., International Monetary Fund (IMF), THE GLOBAL CYBER THREAT, published in March 2021, available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2021/03/global-cyber-threat-to-financial-systems-maurer.htm, access on: 6 August 2024. See also, Feingold S., Wood J., World Economic Forum, Global financial stability at risk due to cyber threats, IMF warns. Here's what to know, published on 15 May 2024, available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/05/financial-sector-cyber-attack-threat-imf-cybersecurity/, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xxiii] OECD (2024), “New perspectives on measuring cybersecurity”, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 366, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b1e31997-en.

[xxiv] The White House, National Cybersecurity Strategy, published on: 1 March 2023, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-2023.pdf, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xxv] European Commission. Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2 Directive), available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/nis2-directive, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xxvi] Australian Government, Cyber, Digital and Technology Policy Division Department of Home Affairs 4 National Circuit Barton ACT 2600, Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy 2020, published on: 6 August 2020, available at: https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/cyber-security-strategy-2020.pdf, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xxvii] Kastelic A., International Cooperation to Mitigate Cyber Operations against Critical Infrastructure Normative Expectations and Emerging Good Practices, The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), published on: 6 April 2021, available at: https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/International-Cooperation-to-Mitigate-Cyber-Operations-against-Critical-Infrastructure-April-2021.pdf, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xxviii] For more information please see: https://thegfce.org/.

[xxix] Klimburg A., Joshi A., Beato F., World Economic Forum, Why defining and securing systemically important critical infrastructure is so vital, published on: 24 May 2022, available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/05/securing-systemically-important-critical-infrastructure/, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xxx] Press G., 6 Reasons Israel Became A Cybersecurity Powerhouse Leading The $82 Billion Industry, Forbes, published on: 18 July 2017, available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2017/07/18/6-reasons-israel-became-a-cybersecurity-powerhouse-leading-the-82-billion-industry/, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xxxi] Gloe Dizioli A., and van Roye B., The resurgence of protectionism: potential implications for global financial stability, European Central Bank, Published as part of the Financial Stability Review November 2018, published in Noember 2018, available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/financial-stability-publications/fsr/special/html/ecb.fsrart201811_2.en.html, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xxxii] UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2024, available at: https://unctad.org/publication/world-investment-report-2024, access: 6 August 2024.

[xxxiii] OECD (2024), "FDI restrictiveness" (indicator), available at: https://doi.org/10.1787/c176b7fa-en, access: on 6  August 2024.

[xxxiv] Henschen H., Juhasz M., Foreign Investment Regulation: Widening the Focus on Both Sides of the Atlantic, published on: 6 December 2023, available at: https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/foreign-direct-investment-regulation-guide/third-edition/article/foreign-investment-regulation-widening-the-focus-both-sides-of-the-atlantic, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xxxv] Bown P. C., The US–China trade war and phase one agreement, The Peterson Institute for International Economics, published in February 2021, available at: https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/us-china-trade-war-and-phase-one-agreement, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xxxvi] For more information please see: https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership.

[xxxvii] For more information please see: https://www.eac.int/trade/international-trade/trade-agreements/african-continental-free-trade-area-afcfta-agreement.

[xxxviii] For more information please see: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/data/oecd-economic-outlook-statistics-and-projections_eo-data-en

[xxxix] For examples please see: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/oecd-policy-responses-to-coronavirus-covid-19_5b0fd8cd-en

[xl] For more information please see: mneguidelines.oecd.org/mneguidelines/

[xli] For more information please see: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/policy-issues/base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-beps.html.

[xlii] For more information please see: https://www.oecd.org/en/data/indicators/fdi-restrictiveness.html

[xliii] OECD, The Council, Recommendation of the Council on Digital Security Risk Management, adopted on 26 September 2022, OECD/LEGAL/0479, available at: https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0479, access on: 6 August 2024.

[xliv] European Commission, Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament And The Council Advancing European economic security: an introduction to five new initiatives, COM(2024) 22 final, published on 24 January 2024, available at: https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2024-01/Communication%20on%20European%20economic%20security.pdf, access on: 7 August 2024. See also, OECD (2022), Framework for Screening Foreign Direct Investment into the EU: Assessing effectiveness and efficiency, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f75ec890-en.

[xlv] OECD (2019), Good Governance for Critical Infrastructure Resilience, OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies, OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/02f0e5a0-en.

[xlvi] For more information please see: https://ccdcoe.org/

[xlvii] OECD. (2020). "OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project: Addressing the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy." https://doi.org/10.1787/23132612.

[xlviii] For more information please see: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/fighting-foreign-bribery.html#:~:text=The%20OECD%20Anti%2DBribery%20Convention%20establishes%20legally%20binding%20standards%20to,measures%20that%20make%20this%20effective..

[xlix] OECD (2009), "Protectionism? Tariffs and Other Barriers to Trade", in International Trade: Free, Fair and Open?, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264060265-5-en.

[l] The GDPR, enforced since May 25, 2018, mandates strict regulations on data handling, requiring organizations to obtain explicit consent from individuals before processing their data, ensure data security through encryption, and allow individuals to access and delete their personal data. For more information, see the European Commission’s overview of the GDPR here: https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection_en.

[li] For more information please see: California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) | State of California - Department of Justice - Office of the Attorney General.

[lii] For more information please see: Texas Data Privacy And Security Act | Office of the Attorney General (texasattorneygeneral.gov).

[liii] Schmelzer, M. (2014). A Club of the Rich to Help the Poor? The OECD, “Development”, and the Hegemony of Donor Countries. In: Frey, M., Kunkel, S., Unger, C.R. (eds) International Organizations and Development, 1945–1990. The Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137437549_8

[liv] Clifton, J. and Díaz-Fuentes, D. (2011), From ‘Club of the Rich’ to ‘Globalisation à la carte’? Evaluating Reform at the OECD. Global Policy, 2: 300-311. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2011.00103.x

[lv] Linster, M. and C. Yang (2018), "China’s Progress Towards Green Growth: An International Perspective", OECD Green Growth Papers, No. 2018/05, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/76401a8c-en.

[lvi] Arnold, J. (2012), "Improving the Tax System in Indonesia", OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 998, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5k912j3r2qmr-en.

[lvii] OECD (2021), "Education Policy Outlook in Brazil: With a focus on international policies", OECD Education Policy Perspectives, No. 37, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e97e4f72-en.

[lviii] Bounds A., Who could be the next EU trade commissioner? New chief must tackle resistance to bloc’s green agenda, strike right balance on tariffs and reckon with potential Trump win, Financial Times, published on: 5 August 2024, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/abbe9ec2-84ff-4b28-8363-628facb10d3d?desktop=true&segmentId=7c8f09b9-9b61-4fbb-9430-9208a9e233c8#myft:notification:daily-email:content, access on: 6 August 2024.

[lix] Belin C., Ruge M., Shapiro J., Brace Yourself: How The 2024 US Presidential Election Could Affect Europe, European Council on Foreign Relations, published in May 2023, available at: https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Brace-yourself-How-the-2024-US-presidential-election-could-affect-Europe.pdf, access on: 6 August 2024.

[lx] Gijs C., Zimmermann A. Haeck P., EU and US vow to team up against China, but can’t hide the cracks, Politico, published on: 5 April 2024, available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-us-trade-tech-council-vestager-vow-team-up-against-china-cant-hide-cracks/, access on: 6 August 2024.

[lxi] Labour Party Manifesto 2024: Our plan to change Britain, published on: 13 June 2024, available at: https://labour.org.uk/change/, access on: 19 August 2024.

[lxii] Schwarzer D.. “It’s time to reset EU-UK relations. The geopolitical landscape means member states now have an interest in rethinking how to work with London”, Financial Times, published on 20 June 2024, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/4a28bc4a-a832-450d-b879-493372341a29, access on: 29 August 2024.

[lxiii] Khurana M., How is India’s trade landscape shaping up for the future?, Economics Observatory, published on: 21 March 2024, available at: https://www.economicsobservatory.com/how-is-indias-trade-landscape-shaping-up-for-the-future, access on: 6 August 2024.