CFIS 24: Paris Insights – Securing Europe’s Future: Investment Screening and Economic Security in the Context of EU Enlargement

Part 1: Introduction

The upcoming European Commission is poised to make the most consequential decisions regarding EU accession in decades. The opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova has reenergized the stalled accession process bringing new hopes for accelerated reforms and a deepening economic integration. President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen committed to the enlargement process as a “core priority” of her 2024-2029 commission.[i] Yet, increasing economic links between the EU and candidate countries will also expose the EU to the acute geoeconomic challenges unique to Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.

The EU currently does not have an integrated approach on economic security in accession candidates. Yet, governments in all the accession candidates have either recently introduced legislation on Investment Screening Mechanisms (ISMs),[ii]  or started exploring the possibility of introducing legislation. This brief seeks to outline the current steps taken by the EU to promote economic security policy in accession states and identify key considerations for the EU’s evolving policy. A specific focus on ISMs as an economic security policy tool will be taken, given the pressing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) related security implications in accession states. The paper will identify key areas where the EU and its member states should consider strengthening outreach, coordination, and technical support with candidate countries to promote economic security across the European community.

Part 2: Current Challenges in EU Candidate Countries

Russia’s assault on Eastern Europe has not only manifested itself in the invasions of Ukraine and Georgia, but also a sophisticated campaign of hybrid warfare including geostrategic weaponization of state aligned economic actors. Russia’s leveraging of the energy sector is well known to the European Union and has forced states in the Eastern Partnership and Western Balkans to rapidly diversify their energy sectors since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Yet, even with this recent push for diversification, lingering concern remain over Russia’s longstanding economic presence in these regions. Russia was the single largest source of FDI in Montenegro over the past decade.[iii] Deep economic ties remain between Russia and Serbia even after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Entities aligned with Russia continue to control key parts of Moldova’s energy infrastructure through the separatist Transnistria region.[iv]

China has also rapidly expanded its pursuit of economic partnerships in both Eastern Partnership and Western Balkan countries over the past decade. These economic ties could come in conflict with the EU’s China-focused[v] Economic Security Strategy. Most notably in Serbia, China has invested significantly in critical infrastructure across both regions. China has financed a wide array of transportation, energy, medical, and mining projects in the EU candidate countries which have been met with widespread allegations of non-transparency or attempted political influence.[vi] A 2022 briefing document published by the European Parliament noted that Chinese investments in the Balkans could undermine EU accession due to their lack of conditionality, non-transparency, and non-compliance with EU digital and environmental standards.[vii] Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic have voiced concerns at the significant Chinese preparations to invest in the reconstruction of Ukraine.[viii] Moldova has also seen an unprecedented level of Chinese economic diplomacy, including the largest ever Chinese business delegation to the country in June 2024,[ix] likely related to its key role in Ukraine reconstruction.

EU member states share many similar economic security threats as the accession candidates, but they have more capacity to meet them while also balancing open market principles. While still in progress, the various EU economic security tools outlined in the Economic Security Strategy give member states capabilities to address significant economic security threats. The institutional capacity of most EU member states also gives governments the ability to integrate economic and security sector information to take action while requiring minimal administrative burden on business. By contrast, the EU candidate countries frequently lack both the legislative frameworks and institutional capacity needed to address economic security threats while minimizing economic growth tradeoffs. This is particularly concerning given the economic threat profile and need for economic growth priorities in the region. The region’s history of corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency could risk significant pain for the business community if economic security tools are not carefully drafted and implemented with intensive public-private consultations.

Part 3: Strengthening Economic Security in the EU Enlargement Process

EU enlargement in itself is meant to play a strategic role in promoting security, stability, and prosperity across Europe.[x]The 2023 Communication on Enlargement Policy makes it clear that ensuring the candidate countries’ merit-based path to membership is a critical investment in Europe’s collective security.[xi] However, as a result of ongoing geopolitical challenges, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, security and economic risks have escalated. The war has led to surges in energy prices, economic disruptions, as well as heightened security concerns across Europe, affecting both the EU and candidate countries. As a response to these developments, the EU has presented several initiatives to support enlargement countries, including:

• A EUR 1 billion energy support package to reduce reliance on Russian fossil fuels in the Western Balkans;
• a cybersecurity conference hosted by the European Commission in June 2023 to strengthen regional cyber defences;
• financial assistance to support countries like Ukraine and Moldova in their recovery and transition;[xii]
• in addition to the new growth plans for the Western Balkans and Moldova.[xiii]

These and other efforts underline the EU’s continuous commitment to shielding candidate countries from external threats. At the same time, the current situation makes clear the urgent need for aligning the accession countries more closely with the overall Economic Security Strategy of the Union. While the enlargement process has certainly gained momentum with the applications of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia in 2022, the process has dragged on for the countries in the Western Balkans since the Thessaloniki declaration in 2003, where the EU reaffirmed its commitment to the eventual accession of the countries in the region.[xiv] In the resulting vacuum that has emerged, China and Russia have advanced their positions.[xv] Without an increased focus on economic security, undue foreign influence risks undermining political and economic stability in the region, further delaying the path to accession.

A. Integrating Candidate Countries into the EU’s Economic Security Strategy

The EU’s Economic Security Strategy was launched in 2023 as a response to growing threats posed by geopolitical tensions and technological shifts, aiming to secure the Union’s economic foundation while ensuring openness to global markets.[xvi]  The Strategy evolves around four areas where risks to economic security are to be identified and mitigated: a) supply chain resilience, including energy security; b) physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure; c) technology security and technology leakage; and d) weaponisation of economic dependencies or economic coercion. The strategy is highly relevant to candidate countries due to their existing vulnerabilities across the four risk areas outlined in the strategy.

Beginning with the issue of supply chain resilience, many candidate states are highly dependent on fossil fuels and characterised by low energy diversification,[xvii] which threatens the resilience of their energy supply. Including them more actively in measures such as RepowerEU, which aims to secure the EU's energy supply by encouraging the production of renewable energy and diversifying the supply of energy sources, would further reduce their dependence on Russian fossil fuels and increase their energy resilience. In terms of technological security, the development of China's ‘Digital Silk Road’ in the Western Balkans raises concerns. Huawei was reportedly one of the main candidates for the launch of 5G in Serbia, but also North Macedonia, before the government paused the 5G rollout indefinitely after Serbia signed an agreement with the United States to exclude ‘unreliable actors’ from 5G networks.[xviii] Measures such as the Cyber Resilience Act and the 5G Toolbox,[xix] which also form part of the Economic Security Strategy and aim to ensure cyber resilience, could help candidate countries ensure secure 5G rollouts, preventing technology dependence on unreliable operators. Economic coercion also remains a challenge. For example, there are reports of undue influence on the legislative process in Serbia to meet the demands of Chinese investors,[xx] likely made possible by the fear of economic consequences if the demands are not accommodated. The Anti-Coercion Instrument, already employed within the EU, would empower these states to resist undue foreign influence and align more closely with EU economic and political objectives. Given the range of vulnerabilities in candidate countries, the Economic Security Strategy’s tools are essential for safeguarding their economic and political stability. This draws attention to an element of the strategy which is of particular relevance to the candidate countries: The FDI Screening Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2019/452).

The FDI regulation establishes a framework enabling member states to review foreign investments that could jeopardize national security or public order. The regulation is designed to shield, inter alia, critical infrastructure, critical technologies, and supply of critical inputs such as energy from foreign influence. The regulation thus makes it possible to address security risks across the board of risk areas identified in the Economic Security Strategy.

The recent proposal to revise the FDI regulation further underscores its importance in reducing geopolitical risks and enhancing economic security.[xxi] Crucially, the current proposal for revising the FDI regulation will make the implementation of ISMs mandatory for all EU member states.[xxii] Assuming the proposal enters into force, candidate countries will thus be obliged to implement ISMs as a part of the EU acquis pre-accession to the Union.[xxiii]

B. The Need to Harmonize Investment Screening Mechanisms for Integration

Through the harmonization of economic security measures, candidate countries have a better possibility of integrating economically with the EU. The implementation of ISMs in line with the EU FDI Regulation would be a good starting point, for several reasons. The lack of ISMs in candidate countries leaves them vulnerable to FDI from malign actors, including investors acting in the interests of authoritarian regimes, which entails a risk to their economic and political sovereignty. Many of these countries have largely underdeveloped infrastructure,[xxiv] providing ample opportunities for FDI in energy, transport, and other sensitive sectors. Given the strategic interest which China has shown in Southern and Eastern Europe,[xxv] FDI can also have significant geopolitical implications. Furthermore, the deep economic integration of the Single Market means that a non-screened transaction into one Member State may have repercussions across many other Member States, such that foreign investors seeking to invest in sensitive sectors may choose to invest in non-screening member states to get access to the internal market. Candidate countries should pre-empt this possibility by harmonizing ISMs with EU standards, preparing themselves for full integration with the Single Market, and ensuring a consistent approach to managing security implications of FDI across the Union.

Beyond security implications, there is also an economic argument for introducing ISMs. FDI contributes to prosperity, improves the business environment, and enhances the competitiveness of local enterprises in host economies.[xxvi]Taking the Western Balkans as an example, this region is already an attractive destination for FDI due to factors such as wage competitiveness, lower transportation emissions, and geographic proximity to large EU markets. For EU-based investors in particular, the region could be increasingly attractive for investment due to its proximity to the EU; this can be seen as an outflow of nearshoring, where the uncertainty of global supply chains means that the desire for security of supply trumps the need for cost efficiency.[xxvii] However, to maintain investment attraction, investment regimes should be continuously updated to ensure ease of doing business. Here, ISMs, as one of several factors influencing FDI inflows, can play a role in shaping investor decisions.[xxviii] As such, the introduction of ISMs in line with EU standards, ensuring fair and transparent screening practices, can help foster investor confidence and attract FDI.[xxix] While there is no integrated effort by the EU to accession candidates on investment screening, individual member states (most notably Czechia, Romania, and Germany) have conducted some trainings, briefings, and initial outreach. For example, Romania has invited officials from Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans to join an upcoming convening of EU officials on screening in Bucharest. Czechia has also been involved in similar initiatives.

In this context, a positive message was recently delivered by the Foreign Ministers of the Western Balkans in the framework of Germany’s Berlin Process, announcing commitments on the establishment of regional FDI Screening Standards to harmonise investment policies with EU standards.[xxx] To reinforce this momentum, the EU should play a more active role in encouraging and assisting candidate countries to adopt ISMs. While the EU has acknowledged the increasing levels of FDI in candidate countries, as well as their lack of implementation of ISMs in line with the FDI regulation, it has not explicitly encouraged them to adopt such instruments.[xxxi]

Part 4: State of Play on Investment Screening in Candidate Countries

Governments in the EU candidate countries have taken limited initial action to introduce ISMs as their first step on the path to integrated economic security strategies. For the purposes of this brief, the latest developments in the active accession states of Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkans, and Georgia will be examined.

The only country among the active candidate states to have adopted legislation on investment screening is Moldova. In November 2021, Moldova swiftly adopted a law establishing a formal national security screening mechanism for high-risk investments.[xxxii] This law became an urgent priority for the government amid specific concerns of Russian linked investments in critical infrastructure. One prominent example is the Chisinau airport, which has been under concession since 2014 to Avia Invest, a company led by Ilan Shor, a pro-Russian oligarch and Moldovan politician who is currently a fugitive.[xxxiii] The law outlines a range of industries and assets critical to state security, but was initially criticised by the business community for a lack of procedural clarity, unclear thresholds, retroactive applications, and the expedited adoption process with minimal consultations. In 2023, hoping to reduce administrative opaqueness for the investor community and improve effectiveness of the law, the Moldovan government, after an initiative from the business community, entered into an extensive consultation process to substantially revise the legislation and procedural implementation.[xxxiv]

In 2021, Ukraine also introduced draft legislation on the establishment of an FDI screening mechanism on national security grounds, but this law has still not been adopted.[xxxv] Political actors in the US, more so than the EU, have taken a particular interest in this draft law. In July 2024, US Senator Marco Rubio introduced legislation calling on the US government to support Ukraine in developing a screening mechanism in order to block Chinese malign economic influence in Ukraine’s reconstruction. While the bill has not yet passed, the US State Department has engaged in dialogue and initial support to the Government of Ukraine on this matter.[xxxvi] In fact, the US Government has been engaged across the EU accession states to provide initial trainings and technical support on FDI screening (typically also bringing along EU member state and commission officials to support trainings).[xxxvii] For example, the US government is actively supporting Kosovo, a potential EU candidate, to develop and implement an ISM in line with EU and international best practices.[xxxviii]

Kosovo, a potential candidate for EU accession, is the first jurisdiction in the Western Balkans to draft legislation initiating the process of aligning its rules with a new ISM alike to the one existing in the EU.[xxxix] Yet, the legislation has still not been adopted at this time. While it has not yet drafted legislation, North Macedonia become a model for strategic and structured approach in establishment of public - private dialog concerning investment screening, through a governmental working group in 2023 mandated to draft investment screening legislation.

Albania, Montenegro, Georgia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have not initiated formal processes to develop ISMs in line with the EU guidelines, but each country has begun exploratory efforts by officials (including beginning consultations with EU member states on their national FDI screening procedures or participating in informational trainings).

Part 5: Moving Forward

Despite the progress made in ensuring economic security for the EU’s Member States, there is currently no unified strategy to align candidate countries with the Union on these issues. Most support to EU accession candidates on FDI screening has been provided either by individual member states or the US.[xl] Here, the EU has an opportunity to play a bigger role in emphasizing these concerns more clearly as a part of the accession process. Providing the candidate countries with the tools to better shield themselves from external threats would also contribute to strengthening the Union’s overall strategic autonomy.

To begin with, the importance of international cooperation and coordination in these matters must be emphasized. Divergent screening regimes can lead to security risks, as indicated by the evaluation of the current EU FDI Regulation. Regulatory inconsistencies can also lead to increased legal costs for investors and overcompliance, as well as a situation where countries with laxer screening rules are seen as more welcoming to FDI, which in turn creates incentives for countries to establish less stringent rules.[xli] As such, there is a need for coordinated efforts. Possible avenues for institutionalizing cooperation on investment screening and other economic security issues are plurilateral agreements and working groups.[xlii] Such forums should include cooperation with other close allies, such as the US, in addition to the EU. The use of ”partnerships” and other forms of informal cooperation is not a novel phenomenon in this context.[xliii] A recent example is the establishment of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council to foster greater transatlantic coordination on trade, economic, and technology issues. In the context of FDI screening, establishing a plurilateral working group would be a way to maintain a unified approach to screening between the EU, candidate countries, and other allies, while ensuring an effective implementation of ISMs in candidate countries through the exchange of technical expertise and experience. Such dialogue should also include information sharing, similar to the current cooperation mechanism in the FDI Regulation. This measure would align the accession countries closer with the overall economic strategy of the EU and other key partners such as the US. Yet, while the US initiatives have been critical in supporting early development of economic security tools in some accession candidates, the EU ultimately must have a central role in the economic security of its future members.

Furthermore, the EU should more strongly articulate its priority that candidate countries implement ISMs in the framework of the enlargement process. As mentioned previously, the current proposal for a new FDI regulation will make the introduction of screening rules mandatory for member states, rendering the implementation of such rules a mandatory requirement for EU membership. The implementation of ISMs should not however be regarded merely as a box to be checked prior to membership of the Union. Rather, ensuring economic security is equally important during the process towards membership, as it protects candidate countries from undue political and economic influence and thus facilitates the path to accession. Targeted EU integration acceleration frameworks, such as Germany's Berlin Process or the EU Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, have proven effective at securing political commitments from candidate countries. Yet, they need to be expanded, aligned with the EU Economic Security Strategy, and reinforced with clear economic incentives (i.e. market access, preferential status, aid, or investment) to ensure commitments are followed through on.

The candidate countries should also as a matter of priority intensify their efforts to implement robust ISMs in line with EU standards. This is likely to be a challenging process, as exemplified above in the case of Moldova’s implementation of screening rules. The process can be facilitated if candidate countries learn from the EU’s own past experiences,[xliv]while also taking guidance from the OECD’s work in analysing and developing best practices for investment policies.[xlv] The FDI Screening Regulation offers a framework which can be adapted by candidate countries to their specific national contexts, calibrated in consultation with economic stakeholders, while ensuring alignment with the EU’s standards.

In any event, the announcement that the Western Balkan countries have agreed to introduce ISMs, as well as the ongoing legislative initiatives in Kosovo, North Macedonia, Moldova and Ukraine, show that there is a will to address these issues.  Overall, A cohesive and forward-looking approach to economic security in general, and to FDI screening in particular, will ultimately contribute to a more secure and prosperous Europe, benefiting both the EU and its future members.

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[i] European Commission, ‘Statement by the European Parliament Plenary, President Ursula von der Leyen, Candidate for a Second Mandate’ (18 July 2024) <https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/statement-european-parliament-plenary-president-ursula-von-der-leyen-candidate-second-mandate-2024-2024-07-18_en> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[ii] An Investment Screening Mechanism being an instrument which allows a State to assess, investigate, authorise, condition, or prohibit a Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

[iii] Ronja Kempin, ‘Resilience Against Russian Hybrid Threats: Moldova Between Hope and Fear’ (SWP, May 2023) <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2023C36/> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[iv] Katri Pynnöniemi, ‘Moldova’s Struggle Against Russia’s Hybrid Threats’ (Hybrid CoE Working Paper January 2024) <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/20240129-Hybrid-CoE-Working-Paper-28-Moldovas-struggle-against-Russias-hybrid-threats-WEB.pdf> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[v] Sarah Wheaton, ‘EU Infighting Stalls von der Leyen Push to Safeguard Tech Against China’ (Politico 18 July 2024) <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-in-fighting-stall-von-der-leyen-push-safeguard-tech-against-china/> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[vi] Igor Tchoukarine, ‘China’s Investment in the Balkans: A Decade of Discontent’ (The Diplomat, 16 May 2024) <https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/chinas-investment-in-the-balkans-a-decade-of-discontent/> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[vii] European Parliamentary Research Service, ‘The EU’s Economic Security Strategy’ (European Parliament 2022) <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2022)733558> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[viii] Marco Rubio, ‘Rubio Introduces Bill to Deter Chinese Influence in Ukraine’ (Press Release, 24 May 2024) <https://www.rubio.senate.gov/rubio-introduces-bill-to-deter-chinese-influence-in-ukraine/> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[ix] IPN, ‘Largest Ever Delegation of Chinese Businessmen Visits Moldova for Investment’ (IPN 3 June 2024) <https://www.ipn.md/en/largest-ever-delegation-of-chinese-businessmen-visits-moldova-for-investment-7966_1105007.html> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[x] Joris Larik, Peter Van Elsuwege and Bart Von Vooren, ’The External Dimension of Joining and Leaving the EU’, in Ramsel A Wessel and Joris Larik (eds), EU External Relations Law (Hart Publishing 2020), 472; Commission, ‘2023 Communication on Enlargement Policy’ (COM) 2023 690 final, 2.

[xi] ’2023 Communication on Enlargement Policy’ (n 2) 15.

[xii] ’2023 Communication on Enlargement Policy’ (n 2) 14; Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, ‘Montenegro – Center for Cybersecurity Capacity Building in the Western Balkans’ (France Diplomacy 16 November 2022) <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/montenegro/news/article/montenegro-center-for-cybersecurity-capacity-building-in-the-western-balkans-16> Accessed 10 October 2024.

[xiii] European Commission, ‘A New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans’ (European Commission 26 July 2023) <https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/new-growth-plan-western-balkans_en> Accessed 8 October 2024.; European Commission, 'Commission Adopts €1.8 Billion Support Package to Underpin Moldova's Economic Growth Plan on Its Path to the EU' (Press Release, European Commission 10 October 2024) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5124> Accessed 10 October 2024.

[xiv] European Commission, ‘Statement by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, on the Adoption by the Council of the Accession Treaty’ (Press Release, European Commission 14 April 2003) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_03_163> Accessed 9 October 2024.

[xv] Gazmend Qorraj, Arben Hajrullahu and Driton Qehaja, ’Absorption Capacity and the European Integration of the Western Balkans‘ (2024) 16 Regional Science Policy & Practice 100043.

[xvi] Commission, ’An EU Approach to Enhance Economic Security’ (Press Release, European Commission 20 June 2023) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_23_3358/IP_23_3358_EN.pdf> Accessed 3 October 2024.

[xvii] OECD, Western Balkans Competitiveness Outlook 2024: Regional Profile, Competitiveness and Private Sector Development (OECD Publishing 2024), 147.

[xviii] P Zakary, 'Surveying China’s Digital Silk Road in the Western Balkans' (War on the Rocks 10 August 2021) <https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/surveying-chinas-digital-silk-road-in-the-western-balkans/> Accessed 10 October 2024.

[xix] The Commission has already proposed to implement the 5G Toolbox in the Western Balkan countries under the Western Balkans Growth Plan: European Commission, ‘A New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans’ COM (2023) 691 final.

[xx] Branislav Stanicek and Simona Tarpova, ’China’s Strategic Interests in the Western Balkans’ (PE 733.558, European Parliamentary Research Service June 2022), 6.

[xxi] Commission, ’Advancing European Economic Security: An Introduction to Five New Initiatives’ COM (2024) 22 final; Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Screening of Foreign Investments in the Union and Repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council’ COM (2024) 23 Final.

[xxii] ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Screening of Foreign Investments in the Union and Repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council’ (n 21).

[xxiii] European Union, ‘Glossary of Summaries - Acquis’ (Eur-Lex) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/acquis.html> Accessed 6 October 2024.

 

[xxiv] ’2023 Communication on Enlargement Policy’ (n 2) 15.

[xxv] Branislav Stanicek and Simona Tarpova (n 21).

[xxvi] OECD, ‘Managing Security Implications of International Investment: Policy Developments in a Changing World’ (2024) DAF/INV/WD(2024)5/REV;OECD, Western Balkans Competitiveness Outlook 2024: Regional Profile, Competitiveness and Private Sector Development (OECD Publishing 2024), 147.

[xxvii] Thomas Röttinger and others, ‘How Germany Can Realize Friendshoring in Its Neighborhood’ (DGAP 26 September 2023) <https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/how-germany-can-realize-friendshoring-its-neighborhood> Accessed 9 October 2024.

[xxviii] Lorenzo Bencivelli and others, ‘The Rise of Foreign Investment Screening in Advanced Economies’ (VoxEU 16 November 2023) <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/rise-foreign-investment-screening-advanced-economies> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[xxix]ibid.

[xxx] Conference of Foreign Ministers as Part of the Berlin Process, ‘Statement of the Participants from the Western Balkans Six on Enhancing Cooperation Ahead of the Berlin Process Summit’ (Press Release, Federal Foreign Office 1 October 2024) <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2678328> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[xxxi] ’2023 Communication on Enlargement Policy’ (n 2) 37.

[xxxii]US Department of State, ‘2024 Investment Climate Statements: Moldova’ (US Department of State 2024) <https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-investment-climate-statements/moldova/> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[xxxiii] Balkan Insight, ‘Moldova Wins Case Over Terminated Airport Concession’ (Balkan Insight 4 August 2022) <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/08/04/moldova-wins-case-over-terminated-airport-concession/> Accessed 10 October 2024.

³⁴ CELIS Institute, ‘The CELIS Institute Together with BLOMSTEIN Have Successfully Assisted AmCham Moldova in Improving the National Moldovan FDI Law and Aligning It with Best Practices in the EU’ (CELIS Blog 2024) <https://www.celis.institute/celis-blog/the-celis-institute-together-with-blomstein-have-successfully-assisted-amcham-moldova-in-improving-the-national-moldovan-fdi-law-and-align-it-with-best-practises-in-the-eu/> Accessed 4 October 2024; AmCham Moldova, ‘AmCham Explains: The Law on the mechanism for examining investments of importance for state security’ (YouTube 18 March 2024) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BfPgR9EAx5g> Accessed 10 October 2024.

[xxxv] Baker McKenzie, ‘Ukraine to Introduce a Foreign Investment Screening Regime’ (Baker McKenzie 28 January 2021) <https://foreigninvestment.bakermckenzie.com/2021/01/28/ukraine-to-introduce-a-foreign-investment-screening-regime/> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[xxxvi] Marco Rubio, ‘Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)’ (July 2024) <https://www.rubio.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/CFIUS.pdf> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[xxxvii] Commercial Law Development Program, ‘Investment Screening’ (CLDP) < https://cldp.doc.gov/category/areas-expertise/investment-screening> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[xxxviii] US Department of State, ‘2024 Investment Climate Statements: Kosovo’ (US Department of State 2024) <https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-investment-climate-statements/kosovo/> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[xxxix] White & Case, ‘Foreign Direct Investment Reviews 2024: Western Balkans’ (White & Case 2024) < https://www.whitecase.com/insight-our-thinking/foreign-direct-investment-reviews-2024-western-balkans> Accessed 4 October 2024.

[xl] For examples of US initiatives, see US Department of Commerce, 'Investment Screening' (Commercial Law Development Program, US Department of Commerce 2024) <https://cldp.doc.gov/category/areas-expertise/investment-screening> Accessed 8 October 2024.

[xli] David Korn, Thibault Denamiel and William Alan Reinsch, ‘Harmonizing Inbound Investment Screening’ (Commentary, Center for Strategic & International Studies 16 August 2024) <https://www.csis.org/analysis/harmonizing-inbound-investment-screening> Accessed 10 October 2024.

[xlii] ibid.

[xliii] Sophie Bohnert, ‘The Growing “Informalisation” of EU Trade and Investment Law: The End of a Rules-Based Order?’ (CELIS blog, CELIS Institute 18 September 2024) <https://www.celis.institute/celis-blog/cfis-24-paris-insights-the-current-global-regulatory-investment-environment-the-oecd-countries-perspective-on-economic-security-copy/> Accessed 10 October 2024.

[xliv] For example the Commissions extensive evaluation of the current FDI regulation: Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document, Evaluation of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 Establishing a Framework for the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the Union’ SWD (2024) 23 final.

[xlv] OECD, ‘Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies Relating to National Security’ (OECD  2009); OECD, ‘Managing Security Implications of International Investment: Policy Developments in a Changing World’ (2024) DAF/INV/WD(2024)5/REV.